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CREWMEMBER AGREEMENT INVALID WHEN SIGNED BY PERSON OTHER THAN MASTER 
46 U.S.C. § 10601 unambiguously requires that fishing agreements with each seaman 
contain certain substantive provisions, including a concrete requirement that the vessel 
master sign the agreement. 
Harper v. United States Seafoods L.P. 
278 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(Decided January 29, 2002, cert. denied 154 L.Ed. 2d 134, 123 S.Ct. 79, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 
6444(2002)) 
On January 11, 2000, Joe Harper ("Harper") signed a contract with United States 
Seafoods, L.P. ("United States Seafoods"), to work as a processor aboard its fishing vessel "the 
Sea freeze." The employment agreement was signed, on behalf of the employer, by the 
company's recruiting and hiring agent in Seattle. The vessel's master did not sign this contract. 
Harper completed his contractual duties with United States Seafoods on April 28, 2000. 
Thereafter, United States Seafoods paid Harper per the terms under his contract. However, 
Harper filed suit alleging that the contract itself was invalid, because it did not meet the specific 
requirements outlined under 46 U.S.C. § 10601, and that he was entitled to additional wages, to 
be calculated by awarding the highest rate of pay for seamen of similar rating out of the same port 
of hire under 46 U.S.C. § 11107. This action was filed against United States Seafoods in 
personam, and against the vessel "the Seafreeze" in rem, claiming that the employment contract 
was defective. 
Harper moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of the validity of the 
employment contract with United States Foods. Relying on the unambiguous, plain meaning of 
46 U.S.C. § 10601 in granting the motion, the district court held that the contract was invalid 
because the statute required the ship's master to sign the employment agreement. United States 
Seafoods then filed an interlocutory appeal, which represents the instant issue before the Court. 
Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Southwest Marine, 194 F.3d 1009, 1013 (91h Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Kesselring v. FIT Artie Hero, 30 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating, "Ordinarily, interlocutory 
orders are not appealable, but 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(3) creates an exception to the final judgment 
rule for orders determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases."). 
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The Court, reviewing de novo, stated that to affirm a grant of summary judgment the 
question becomes one of pure statutory interpretation. The Court affirmed, holding that 46 
U.S.C. §10601, relating to employment agreements for fishing vessels, clearly requires the 
master's signature in order to make the agreement valid. In evaluating the statute, the Court 
conducted a three-tier interpretation including historical backdrop, language, and comparison 
with additional admiralty statutes. 
The Court took into account all prior statutory provisions related to § 1060 1. It noted that 
statutory protection of the seafarer's right to a written contract dates back to one of the first acts 
of Congress. Cases under such predecessor acts refer to the master's signature, suggesting that a 
similar interpretation of the successor statute § 10601 is consistent with the historical 
interpretation. The Court further concluded that the requirement of the master's signature was 
assumed necessary in prior case law under these predecessor acts. United States v. Atkins, 24 
F.Cas. 885 (D. Mass. 1856); Crowell v. United States, 6 F.Cas. 912, 9 13 (C.C. Mass. 1856). 
The text of § 10601 was then examined. The Court considered the language of the statute 
to be clear and unambiguous, thereby making the text controlling. The requirement in § 10601(a) 
that the master and the seamen "make a fishing agreement in writing" clearly requires both 
parties to sign the agreement. The Court noted that the statute's second paragraph required that 
"the agreement shall be signed also by the owner of the vessel." 46 U.S.C § 10601(b). The Court 
reasoned that to give "also" effect in subsection (b), it must be concluded that subsection (a) 
imposes a signing requirement of the master and seaman. The Court held that this interpretation 
of the statute was neither absurd nor impracticable and that such a requirement, that the contract 
bear both the signatures of master and owner, is neither unwieldy nor unworkable. 
United States Seafoods argued that § 1060 1 should be read only to require the 
fisherman's, and not the master's, signature. This strained reading of the statute was rejected. 
United States Seafoods also argued that such "technical deficiencies" should not be considered as 
a breach of the statute. The Court interpreted this as an argument for the excuse of a violation 
under § 10601 where there has been "substantial compliance." The Court, after noting that the 
Ninth Circuit has frequently rejected substantial compliance arguments, rejects the argument here 
as well, arguing that the master did nothing even arguably equivalent to signing the contract to 
raise a valid substantial compliance argument. 
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